Introduction
The typical outputs of a democratic process are elected candidates, approved budgets, and approved legislation. While candidates are a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposition, budgets and legislation need not be. Yet, presently, legislatures around the world typically vote on "take-it-or-leave-it" budgets and legislation, which are produced via opaque processes that are neither deliberative nor egalitarian. This violates the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which states, in Article VI, that "The law is the expression of the general will. All the citizens have the right of contributing personally or through their representatives to its formation" and equally so, according to Article I.
Deliberation and voting seem independent, almost anathemal, activities: In deliberation, the aim is to convince or be convinced; in voting, the aim is to win. Given this chasm, our main contribution here is a process that integrates deliberation and voting for drafting legislation. The process can be used by a legislation-drafting committee, by the legislature itself, by a Special Interest Group (SIG) that wishes to propose new legislation that represents the democratic will of its members, or by the electorate at large.
Our process begins with a given initial common draft, which may be the current legislation if the wish is to amend it or, if this is a completely new topic, a clean slate, i.e., the empty draft. Our process proceeds in rounds, each consisting of a deliberation step followed by a voting step. In the deliberation step, participants may propose (possibly anonymously) revisions to the common draft by publishing their private drafts, and review, discuss, and debate the common draft as well as revisions proposed by other participants. The deliberation step can be as rich and as complex as desired. For example, participants could propose multiple revisions during this step, in order to present their developing ideas as well as to respond to ideas of others. Participants could communicate with each other informally, either off-channel or by commenting on and discussing the common draft as well as the revisions of each other.
In the voting step, the common draft is amended by applying to it edit operations that have majority support. Participants do not vote explicitly on proposed edit operations; rather, they "vote with their words" by proposing their own revisions, namely publishing their private drafts: A published draft implicitly votes for an edit operation to the common draft, or approves it, if it makes the two drafts closer, a notion defined formally below. A published draft ratifies the common draft if it is identical to it.
There is a spectrum of possible criteria to conclude our process, differentiated by the level of consensus wished for and the time that can be afforded. On one extreme, we consider concluding the process as soon as the common draft stabilizes, while on the other extreme we consider concluding the process only when the common draft has unanimous support. In any case, our process gives preference to the initial draft, which depicts the status quo [1] , as we require that the final elected common draft must be preferred by a majority over the initial common draft, or else the process is annulled and the status quo is retained. As conclusion according to any of these criteria cannot always be reached, a time limit can be added and then, if no conclusion according to the chosen criterion has been reached by the time limit, the final common draft is elected if preferred over the initial common draft.
Note that a voting step does not require an action from the participants, as it applies the voting algorithm to the extant common draft and the drafts published by the participants, followed by a possible update of the common draft. Yet, the interplay between the time allocated to each round, the total allocated time, and the conclusion criterion will have to be determined by experimentation and experience. For example, we envision week-long rounds for weighty, long-term constitutional matter that can be concluded over a few months; daily rounds for ordinary matters that should be concluded in weeks; and shorter rounds for urgent or simple matters, provided the participants are able and willing to interact with sufficient frequency and intensity. We note that seeking a weak Condorcet winner, concluding deliberation after the first round in which the common draft has not changed, does not bode well with short rounds. On the other hand, if we conclude the debate only after a majority has ratified the common draft, seeking a (strong) Condorcet-winner, then rounds can be short. In principle, rounds are not even necessary for this conclusion criterion, as voting could be done continuously, updating the common draft as soon as a new private draft is published; but the social dynamics resulting from a continuously updated common draft might be more appropriate for popularity contests rather than for thorough deliberation.
Related Work
Our proposed process is for collaborative text editing.
Perhaps the most famous platform for collaborative text editing is Wikipedia, however it is not democratic [2] ; in particular, it does not uphold "one-person one-vote". There are other collaborative efforts of text editing, such as the white paper of Democracy Earth, 1 which nevertheless also violates the one-person one-vote principle. In such efforts, such as in the Soylent text editor [3] , the wisdom of the crowds is utilized to help in the writing process, however an omnipotent entity eventually decides on the end result (and thus, can, e.g., disregard the will of the society altogether). Further examples for this line of efforts are the rewrite of Iceland's constitution (see, e.g., [4, page 18] ), and the traffic law reform in Finland. 2 Here, in contrast, we are interested in truly democratic text editing. Closer to this spirit, we mention the now-inoperable platform MixedInk, which was used, e.g., to suggest an inaugural speech for Barack Obama. 3 MixedInk was a combination of a rating system on top of a collaborative tool such as Google Docs, with features such as merging documents. Another platform also not operating any more is Nick Beauchamp's Democratic Writing platform. 4 Last, we mention Madison 5 and the effort to integrate LiquidFeedback with version control systems. 6 Our main motivation is to improve citizen participation in high-stakes decision making processes, ultimately enabling participatory legislation (see, e.g., [5] ).
Dryzek and List [6] aim to reconcile deliberation and voting. Hartmann and Rad [7] take an epistemological point of view and provide evidence that iterating deliberation and voting increases the probability of recovering the ground truth. Their work addresses only binary decision, and it would be interesting to find out whether their analysis can be extended to ranked voting as proposed here for drafting legislation.
Paper Structure
Section 2 provides a high-level description of our process, including several possibilities for when to conclude it. As our process alternates between deliberation and voting, we go on to discuss deliberation in Section 3, and then discuss voting in Section 4. Section 4 first discusses voting abstractly, in Section 4.1, without commitment to the structure of drafts or to the nature of the edit operations on them. Then, we provide a concrete treatment of voting on edits to sets of sentences 4.2, which is then used in Section 4.3 for our treatment of edits to text, represented as a sequence of sentences. We conclude in Section 5.
Integrating Deliberation and Voting
Our process begins with a given initial common draft, which may be the current legislation if the wish is to amend it or, if this is a completely new topic, a clean slate, i.e., the empty draft. Our process proceeds in rounds, each consisting of a deliberation step followed by a voting step.
In the deliberation step, participants may propose (possibly anonymously) revisions to the common draft by publishing their private drafts, and review, discuss, and debate the common draft as well as revisions proposed by other participants. The deliberation step can be as rich and as complex as desired. For example, participants could propose multiple revisions during this step, in order to present their developing ideas as well as to respond to ideas of others. Participants could communicate with each other informally, either off-channel or by commenting on and discussing the common draft as well as the revisions of each other. The deliberation step is described in Section 3.
In the voting step, the common draft is amended by applying to it edit operations that have majority support. Participants do not vote explicitly on proposed edit operations; rather, they "vote with their words" by proposing their own revisions, namely publishing their private drafts: A published draft implicitly votes for an edit operation to the common draft, or approves it, if it makes the two drafts closer, a notion defined formally below. A published draft ratifies the common draft if it is identical to it. The voting step is described in Section 4. As described above, our process iterates between deliberation and voting. Next we consider a spectrum of possible criteria to conclude our process, depending on the level of consensus wished for and the time that can be afforded.
On one extreme, the process may conclude after the first round in which the common draft has not changed. This means that in that round no change to the common draft had approval by the majority of the published drafts; technically, this means that the common draft is a weak Condorcet winner. A similar result is obtained if there is a stalemate, where no participant further changes its draft. One difficulty with such outcome is that it may reflect an awkward compromise, where nobody is happy with the elected common draft, but support for improving it is fragmented among multiple edit proposals, none having majority support. Hence, the process gives preference to the initial draft, which depicts the status quo [1] : The final elected common draft must be preferred by a majority of the participants over the initial common draft, or else the process is annulled and the status quo is retained.
On the other extreme, deliberation concludes only when consensus has been reached and all participants have ratified the common draft. This ideal conclusion of deliberation is not always attainable. A sensible criterion in between these two extremes is to conclude the process when the majority of the published drafts have ratified the common draft. Technically, this implies that the common draft is a (strong) Condorcet winner and hence is preferred over all other drafts, including the initial common draft. As conclusion according to any of these criteria cannot always be reached, a time limit can be added: If no conclusion according to the chosen criterion has been reached by the time limit, then the final common draft is elected if a majority prefers it over the initial common draft.
The Deliberation Step
Our model of deliberation is simple and open-ended: At each point in time there is a common draft, which reflects the will of the participants at that time.
In addition, each participant may propose, possibly anonymously, revisions to it, by publishing its private draft. Together, the common draft and the participants' published drafts offer the basis for deliberation: A participant can compare the common draft to its private draft and be influenced by it, for example by accepting changes that make its private draft commensurate with the public draft; or, by modifying its private draft to be a more effective alternative to the common draft. Similarly, a participant may compare its private draft to the draft published by a respected opinion-leader and accept changes to its private draft that harmonize the two; alternatively, a participant may compare its draft with that of an opposition leader, in order to sharpen its own position. All these activities can be carried out in private, without any communication except the publication of drafts by participants.
In addition, multiple communication channels can be used to support discussion among participants, as well as among "coalitions" of participants that wish to coordinate the promotion of a common agenda. Our approach and process are agnostic to the particular communication channels chosen and the way they are employed, provided that the outcome of the deliberation is the (potentially ongoing) revision and publication of drafts by the participants.
While the process affords deliberation, it cannot enforce it, as participants may be oblivious to each other and never revise their published drafts. If participants are oblivious, initially or eventually before the desired conclusion condition has been reached (be it consensus or a Condorcet winner), then the process may reach a stalemate, as discussed above.
The Voting Step
The voting step commences with a given common draft and published drafts, and aims to update the common draft to reflect the preferences of the participants, as expressed by their published drafts. We emphasize that while the mathematics presented in this section may be beyond the grasp of most participants and so would any software implementation of it, voting with this system is trivial: Participants propose a revision to the common draft by publishing a private draft different from it, or ratify the common draft by publishing a draft identical to it. The rest, which is described in this section, happens "under the hood".
Implicit Voting in the Abstract
In this section we consider drafts, edit operations, and implicit voting with drafts abstractly, without specifying the structure of drafts or how edit operations affect them; in the following sections we specify the structure of drafts and consider specific edit operations, ultimately leading to text drafts with a standard set of text editing operations.
Thus, in this section we provide a general mathematical exposition of the setting, specifically defining the needed formal definitions, and prove certain structural lemmas which would be useful in the next sections, which offers a specific incarnation of the abstract setting. We see value in this abstract exposition in particular as it highlights certain properties of sets of edit operations which influence the computational complexity and the properties of our process. Definition 1. We assume a potentially infinite set of drafts, D, and a given set of edit operations on drafts, E : D → D. Each edit operation e ∈ E has a cost, cost(e) > 0, which is additive, so for any
The draft resulting from applying an edit operation e ∈ E on c ∈ D is denoted by e(c). The edit distance between two drafts c, c
, is the minimal cost i∈ [n] cost(e i ) of any finite sequence of edit operations e 1 , e 2 , . . . e n , n ≥ 0, that convert c to c
This model is an instance of Distance-based Reality-aware Social Choice [1] , where voters preferences are determined by the edit-distances implied by their published drafts: A published draft prefers a close draft over a distant draft.
Definition 2 (Prefers). Let d, c, c
′ ∈ D be drafts. We say that d prefers c to c
A Condorcet-winner of a set of drafts is a draft c such that for any other draft c ′ , the majority prefers c over c ′ .
An ǫ-Condorcet winner is a draft that is ǫ-away from a Condorcet-winner.
• an ǫ-Condorcet-winner of D, for ǫ > 0, if there is a Condorcet-winner w ∈ D of D and dist(c, w) < ǫ.
A voting process is Condorcet-consistent if it elects a Condorcet-winner whenever such exists. A voting process is ǫ-Condorcet-consistent, for ǫ > 0, if, whenever there is a Condorcet-winner, it elects an ǫ-Condorcet-winner.
The term weak Condorcet-winner is obtained from its unqualified counterpart by replacing > by ≥ in Definition 3; then, the terms weak ǫ-Condorcet-winner, weakly Condorcet-consistent, and weakly ǫ-Condorcet-consistent follow. Observation 1. If there is an ǫ > 0 for which cost(e) ≥ ǫ for all e ∈ E, then if two drafts c, c ′ ∈ D are less than ǫ apart they must be identical, and hence the notions of Condorcet-winner and ǫ-Condorcet-winner coincide, and so do the notions of Condorcet-consistent and ǫ-Condorcet-consistent.
The corresponding weak notions coincide similarly. Next we describe an algorithm, called Implicit Iterated Approval Voting, which is an instance of Iterated Approval Voting [1] . It is "Implicit" in that voters do not cast explicit votes -they simply state their opinions, by publishing their private drafts. We deduce each voter's preference on each edit operation by computing the impact of the edit operation on the distance of the common draft to the voter's published draft: A voter approves an edit operation if it decreases the distance of the common draft to its published draft. if no such edit operation exists, then the process elects w := c and halts.
First we show that Implicit Iterated Approval Voting halts if the set of edit operations is closed under inversion. Definition 5. A set of edit operations E on D is closed under inversion if each edit operation e ∈ E has an inverse e
′ ∈ E such that cost(e) = cost(e ′ Proof. We show that the sum of distances between all published drafts D to the common draft c decreases in each iteration by at least ǫ > 0; since this sum cannot be negative, the process cannot continue indefinitely.
Consider an iteration in which the common draft is c and an edit operation e ∈ E is chosen, and let us investigate the effect of e on d∈D dist(d, c). Let D − be the set of drafts that approve e (since it decreases their distance to c), D − = {d ∈ D : e(c) ≻ d c}, and let D + be the set of drafts that do not approve e,
Since e has an inverse with the same cost, it can increase the distance between c and any d ∈ D by at most cost(e). Hence, D + may contribute a distance increase of at most |D + | · cost(e), whereas D − contributes a distance decrease of exactly |D − | · cost(e). Since e is majority-approved,
The sum of the distances indeed decreases in each iteration by at least ǫ > 0 and therefore the algorithm halts.
The proof above also implies the following corollary, as it shows in particular that in each round the total cost decreases by at least ǫ. We consider another property of sets of edit operations, namely lack of a local maximum. This property would be helpful in showing properties of our voting procedure. Definition 6. A set of edit operations E is free of local maxima if, for any ǫ > 0, it holds that for any set of drafts D
Next we show that Implicit Iterated Approval Voting is ǫ-Condorcet-consistent under the above conditions. The proof follows the observation that Implicit Iterated Approval Voting can be seen as a local search algorithm, and so, if the set of edit operations is free of local maxima, then a local search would find the global maximum.
Claim 1. If the set of edit operations E is closed under inversion and free of local maxima then Implicit Iterated
Approval Voting is ǫ-Condorcet-consistent.
Proof. We need to show that Iterated Approval Voting elects an ǫ-Condorcet-winner assuming D has is Condorcet-winner, E is closed under inversion and is free of local maxima. Since E is closed under inversion, the process halts according to Lemma 2. Let w be the common draft it elects before it halts and assume, by way of contradiction, that w is not an ǫ-Condorcet-winner of D. Since E has no local maxima then, by definition, there is an edit operation e ∈ E to w, cost(e) > ǫ, with majority approval by D. This violates the termination condition of the algorithm and hence it cannot elect w and halt, a contradiction. Therefore, the elected draft w is an ǫ-Condorcet-winner.
Corollary 2. If the set of edit operations E is closed under inversion, free of local maxima, and there is an ǫ > 0 such that cost(e) ≥ ǫ for every e ∈ E, then Implicit Iterated Approval Voting is Condorcet-consistent.
Proof. Due to Claim 1 the algorithm stops and elects an ǫ-Condorcet-winner c, which has a distance ≤ ǫ from some Condorcet winner c ′ . Since no edit operation has cost < ǫ then, according to Lemma 1, c and c ′ coincide. Hence the algorithm elects a Condorcet-winner. Remark 1. To keep the paper focused, we concentrate on Condorcet-consistency. We mention, however, that Claim 1 and Corollary 2 can be stated in stronger terms, as follows. If the set of edit operations E is closed under inversion and free of local maxima then Implicit Iterated Approval Voting is Smith-consistent, which means that it is guaranteed to return a draft which is contained in the Smith set, which is a minimal set of drafts for which each draft in the set is majority-preferred to each draft not in the set. Smith-consistency is a strict generalization of Condorcet-consistency as, in particular, if there is a Condorcet-winner then the Smith set is a singleton containing only the Condorcet-winner and if there are weak Condorcet-winners then the Smith set contains only those.
Implicit Voting on Edits to a Set
The discussion above was set in abstract terms, without commitment to the structure of drafts nor to the specific edit operations. Here we show a concrete, yet limited, example, where we view drafts as finite unordered sets 7 of sentences, and consider two edit operations: inserting a sentence and deleting a sentence.
Edit operations on sets
Definition 7 (Editing a set of sentences with insert and delete). Let S be the set of all sentences and D S the set of all drafts, which are finite sets of sentences of S, D S = {S : S ⊂ S, |S| < ∞}. The set of edit operations E S : D S → D S contains, for each s ∈ S, the unit-cost operations insert s and delete s , defined by
Note that E S is closed under inversion, as insert s (delete s (d)) = d, and delete s (insert s (d)) = d if s / ∈ d, with an operation and its inverse being of equal (unit) cost.
Also, note that the edit distance among members of D S is the size of their symmetric difference:
Majoritarian
sets and weak Condorcet-winners Preparing for the following lemma, recall that, since the cost of each edit operation in E S is 1, then according to Observation 1, the notions of weak Condorcet-winner and weak 1-Condorcet-winner coincide.
Definition 8 (Majoritarian set)
. Let D ⊂ D be a finite set of drafts. Then, the majoritarian set of D, m D , is 7 In fact, our process extends naturally to multisets, and in particular all proofs carry over to this more general setting; for ease of presentation, we concentrate on the simpler setting of sets with no multiplicities. the set of sentences which are members of a majority of the drafts in D, mD = {s : |d ∈ D : s ∈ d| > 
Proof. Let us denote the set of weak Condorcet-winners of D by C and the set {d :
First we show that C ⊆ W . To this end, assume, by way of contradiction, that there is some c ∈ C \ W . Thus, in particular c either (1) contains some d which is not contained in a majority of the drafts or (2) does not contain some d which is contained in a majority of the drafts. For case (1), a majority of the drafts prefers c\ {d} over c, contradicting c being a Condorcet winner. For case (2) , a majority of the drafts prefers c ∪ {d} over c, again contradicting c being a Condorcet winner.
Next we show that W ⊆ C. To this end, assume, by way of contradiction, that there is some w ∈ W \ C. Thus, in particular w is not a Condorcet winner, so there is some Condorcet winner c such that a majority of the drafts prefer c over w. Since c = w, either (1) there is some d ∈ c \ w or (2) there is some d ∈ w \ c. For Case (1), a majority of the drafts prefers c \ {d} over c contradicting c being a Condorcet winner. For Case (2), a majority of the drafts prefers c ∪ {d} over c, again contradicting c being a Condorcet winner. Example 1. Assume that D = {{a}, {b}}. Then, the set of Condorcet-winners is {∅, {a}, {b}, {a, b}}, since in such an extreme case of total disagreement, no majority prefers any set over any of these sets. Furthermore, the set weak-m D = {a, b} is the weak-majoritarian set, and the set m D = ∅ is the majoritarian set.
Electing a Condorcet-winning set in polynomial time
Next we show certain properties of our process, implying that it selects a Condorcet-winner in polynomial time. 
Implicit Voting on Edits to Text
We are now ready to consider voting on legislation, namely text. We view text as a string (i.e., finite sequence) over the infinite alphabet of sentences, and consider the text editing operations of inserting a sentence in a specific location in the text, deleting a sentence from a specific location in the text, and permuting the order of two adjacent sentences in a text. While we assign the cost of 1 to insert and delete, we set the cost of permuting two sentences of a string of length n to 1 n 2 . That is, we give higher weight to getting the right set of sentences, and lower weight to ordering them correctly.
A string of length n can be set in a chosen order with at most n 2 permute operations at a cost of no more than 1. This suggests using the methods developed in Section 4.2 for sets (or multisets) of sentences to first get the right sentences into the common draft, so it is within a distance of 1 to a Condorcet winner that is an ordered majoritarian draft, and then reducing the distance further by permuting the sentences. 8 Specifically, here we assume a process in which sentences are first elected and then ordered.
First voting step: Electing the right sentences
Definition 10 (Editing text with insert, delete and permute). Let S be the set of all sentences and T S the set of all drafts, which are strings of sentences of S, T S = {s 1 · s 2 · . . . s n : s i ∈ S, i ∈ [n]}. The set of edit operations E T : T S → T S contains, for each draft t = s 1 · s 2 · . . . s n ∈ T S of length |t| = n and each sentence s ∈ S, the unit cost operations insert s,i , i ∈ [n + 1], and delete i , i ∈ [n], and the 1 n 2 -cost operation permute i , i ∈ [n − 1], defined as follows:
• delete i (t) = s 1 · . . . s i−1 · s i+1 · . . . s n (with the obvious special cases for i, n ≤ 2).
•
Note that this set of edit operations is closed under inversion. Definition 11 (Membership in a string). For a string t = s 1 · s 2 · . . . s n , we say that s ∈ t iff s = s i for some
This use of set membership allows us to view strings also abstractly as multi-sets. As before, however, to make the mathematical treatment less cumbersome, we 8 Notice that sometimes deferring all the permute operations to the end is not optimal; e.g., to go from the draft ab to the draft bca, it is better to first permute the adjacent a and b and only then insert c between them.
will assume that each sentence occurs at most once in a string, and thus they can be abstracted as sets; this assumption will be relaxed later. Definition 12 (Majoritarian drafts). Let D ⊂ T be a set of drafts. A draft t ∈ T is a majoritarian draft of D if it contains exactly the sentences which are members of the majority of the drafts in D; that is, if for each s it holds that s ∈ t if and only if |{d ∈ D : s ∈ d}| > |D|/n.
The set of majoritarian drafts of D is denoted by
Similarly, the notions of weak majoritarian draft and weak-M D are obtained by replacing > by ≥ in Definition 12.
Note that M D and weak-M D are indeed sets of drafts, as permuting the order of sentences in a draft does not change its set of sentences and hence whether it is majoritarian. Furthermore, the distance between two majoritarian drafts or two weak-majoritarian drafts is at most 1: They differ only in the order of their sentences, and hence can be equated with no more than n 2 permute operations that cost at most 1. In the first case, there is some s / ∈ c such that c is in at least half of the drafts of D. Then, consider the draft c · s (that is, insert s to c) and observe that a majority of the drafts of D prefer c · s to c: This is so since it is possible to move s to its correct place in total operation cost strictly smaller than 1, which is the cost of inserting it. Thus, we contradict c being a Condorcet-winner of D.
In the second case, similarly, there is some s ∈ c such that c is in less then a majority of the drafts of D. Then, consider the draft c \ {s} (that is, delete s from c), and notice the draft majority of D which does not have s prefers c \ {s} over c: This is so since it is possible to move s to its correct place in total operation cost strictly smaller than 1, which is the cost of deleting it. Thus, we contradict c being a Condorcet-winner of D.
Condorcet winners sometimes do not exist in this setting, as the next example demonstrates. Example 3. Let D = {abc, bca, cab}; then, there is no Condorcet winner. To see this, notice that M D = weak-M D = {abc, bac, cab, acb, bca, cba}, thus, following Lemma 7, if there is a Condorcet winner, then it is one of these drafts. However, these draft constitute a Condorcet cycle: abc → bac → cab → acb → bca → cba → abc; e.g., both abc and bca prefer bac over cab.
Nevertheless, if there is a Condorcet winner, then at least we are able to compute, in polynomial time, a draft which is close to it. Claim 2. Finding a 1-Condorcet-winning draft of a set D can be done in polynomial time in |D|.
Proof. We prove the claim by describing a polynomial-time 1-Condorcet-consistent algorithm: The algorithm is Implicit Iterated Approval Voting only on the insert and remove; thus it finds m D . Then, notice that (1) m D ∈ M D ; (2) the Condorcet winner is also in M D (this is the last lemma); (3) the distance of any two drafts in M D is at most 1 since each permute operation costs 1 n 2 and it is always possible to permute one draft to another-containing the same set of sentences-by at most n 2 permute operations. It follows then that our algorithm indeed runs in polynomial time in |D| and is 1-Condorcet-consistent.
Second voting step:
Ordering the elected sentences The section above resulted in a polynomial-time 1-Condorcet-consistent algorithm; specifically, it finds a 1-Condorcet-winning set of sentences. As Step 2 begins once the elected sentences are known, say W , we can limit each draft in D to a permutation of the sentences in W . A trivial exponential-time algorithm would check all permutations of these sentences and would find a Condorcet-winning permutation, if there is one, but we question the wisdom of doing so. The reason is that the Condorcet-winning order of sentences may reflect a compromise that was not offered by any draft and hence might not make sense. Instead, we limit the alternative orders explored to those actually manifested in D, so D embodies both the set of alternatives and the set of votes. Given this choice, the order of sentences in our elected text would be trivially n-way consistent, for n = |W | (this is so as, in this case, each possible elected text must equal at least one private draft).
With this restriction, the task now reduces to finding a Condorcet winner among D. Care must be taken, as, while we wish to select a permutation containing exactly the sentences of W , each published draft d in D might consist of different set of sentences. To solve this conflict, our suggestion is, for each draft d ∈ D, to remove all sentences contained in d but not in W and to consider each sentence of W which is not contained in d as being unordered by d; then, we can generalize the permute operation to define a Condorcet winner.
To achieve this task, we consider a data type, referred to as a string-set, which is a hybrid of a string and a set: A string-set is a string when all its elements are ordered, or a set when none are ordered, or a hybrid, when some are ordered and some are not. It may be visualized as a string with additional elements still floating above it, awaiting to find their place in the string. Definition 13 (String-set). A string-set is a pair (d, s) of a string d and a set s over the same alphabet.
If d is a published draft and W is the winning set sentences of Step 1, we wish to capture the order constraints d induces on members of W by a string-set, which consists of a string with the members of d that are also members of W , in their original order, and a set with the rest of W . This is captured by the following definition. Definition 14. Let d ∈ D be a draft and W a set of sentences. The string-set {d ′ , s} that d induces on W is defined as follows:
• d
′ is a string consisting of the members of d ∩ W , where d is viewed as set, preserving their relative order in d.
Example 4. Consider the string abc and the set W = {b, c, d}. Then, the string-set abc induces on W is (bc, {d}).
We consider the following unit-cost edit operations on a string-set Equipped with these edit operations, we apply Iterated Approval Voting on the set of string-sets that drafts of D induce on the set W obtained in Step 1. The initial string-set is the one the current common draft c induces on W . The algorithm would identify a Condorcet-winning string-set, if such exists. The next example demonstrates that a Condorcet-winning draft is not guaranteed to exist. Example 5. Let D = {abc, acb, bac, bca, cab, cba, abc, bca, cab}; then, there is no Condorcet winner. To see this, observe the following Condorcet cycle: abc → bac → cab → acb → bca → cba → abc.
Even if a Condorcet-winning string-set (d, s) exists, it might still be the case that s is not be empty. As the input to the next round is a string, not a string-set, members of s need to be inserted into d. They can be inserted in an arbitrary place in d, say at the end, with the expectation that participants happy with these sentences (which are by definition a majority for each sentence) but not with their ordering, will place them in their preferred order for the next voting round. We expect that when voting on real text, once the sentences are elected their ordering would not be controversial or at least resolved easily without cycles.
To conclude, our voting step finds a Condorcet winner among the published drafts, if one exists, where the search space of the set of sentences from which the winner is elected is unbounded, and the search space from which the winning ordering of the sentences is elected is limited to actual orderings presented (even if partially) in the drafts published by participants, with orderings underspecified by participants resolved arbitrarily.
Conclusions
We have developed a process for electing a common draft that integrates the most preferred elements (sentences and their ordering) of drafts published by participants. Our process interleaves deliberation and voting, thus helping a community reach a common draft which is, at least, a weak Condorcet winner.
Next we discuss avenues for future research.
Other distances. As different edit operations define different distances on drafts, this choice has the potential for profound implications on the elected draft. Other distances, besides the distances considered here might be worth to explore; for example, one might consider the distances described in the survey by Schiavinotoo [8] .
Related, but far more ambitious, would be to consider so-called "semantic" distances. The idea would be to have a distance measure related to the content of each sentence, so that, intuitively, the distance between semantically-close sentences would be smaller than between sentences whose meaning is very different.
Other elicitation methods. One might consider other elicitation methods, such as voters which directly vote with approvals, voters which rank drafts, etc.
Different aggregation approaches. Here we took a majoritarian approach to aggregating texts, as we applied Condorcet's principle to this setting. It might be interesting to consider applying other social choice frameworks to this setting.
UI considerations.
Here we concentrated on the mathematical foundations of identifying Condorcet-winning drafts for participatory legislation. As we envision our proposal to be manifested as an application to be used by humans, UI considerations are important to tackle. The most immediate aspect to tackle seems to be the ways by which users interact with their private drafts and the common draft.
One way would be to allow participants to review and either accept or reject possible changes to their private drafts as given by other drafts and/or by the common draft: That is, each voter uses a text editor to propose her draft. During deliberation, in the text editor each voter can also review the other proposed drafts, e.g., for each sentence the UI would show the other possibilities proposed by other participants. Then, after a voting iteration, each participant can see the difference between her proposed draft and the current tentative draft and change accordingly if she wishes to.
in M is at most (n−1)|D| (i.e., 
